

Hacking Threat in Arab Cyberspace: How *al-Hākīrz al-Muslimūn* Construct Narratives against Zionists and Anti-Islamists

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Abstract

The attack on the al-Aqsa mosque on April 6, 2023, and the burning of the Qur'an on January 21, 2023, have sparked a reaction from hacker group who call themselves *الهكرز المسلمون* (*al-hākīrz al-muslimūn*) 'Muslim Hackers' (MH). Through the "Hacker News" YouTube channel, they threaten to hack several strategic and vital facilities of the Israeli and Swedish governments. About this phenomenon, this study aims to explain the construction of their threat narratives to those whom they call Zionists and anti-Islamists. Explanative qualitative research was conducted to answer research questions consisting of the formulation of themes, sequence of the scheme, and micro linguistic elements. Research data in the form of 2 videos of MH hacking threats were collected through manual transcription, reading and observation, printing, selection, and classification. Meanwhile, data analysis through the stages of reduction, presentation, analysis, interpretation, and conclusion was carried out by referring to Teun van Dijk's discourse structure model as an analytical framework. The results of the thematic structure analysis show that the theme highlights the actions as a response to attacks on Muslims and Islamic sacred symbols. MH asserts their identity as Muslims explicitly on the theme to attract the audience's attention. In line with these findings, the results of the schematic structure analysis show that the MH threat narrative scheme consists of the cause of threat, form of threat, detail of threat, and impact of threat. Microstructure analysis shows that MH uses clause structures, meaning intentions, and speech acts to launch

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psychological warfare against Zionists and anti-Islamists. Through this narrative, MH spreads fear with the target of putting political pressure on the Israeli and Swedish governments. Observing the increasingly massive and dynamic phenomenon of cyber warfare, it is predicted that MH's hacking threat narratives will often be found in conflicts and political dynamics in various countries.

Keywords: Anti-Islamists; hacking threat; Arabic cyberspace; *al-hākirz al-muslimūn*; Zionists

Introduction

Negative sentiment and physical violence against Muslims in several countries have triggered the spread of a lingual phenomenon called the 'language of threat' among pro-Islamic internet users.¹ One of the latest forms of this phenomenon is the action taken by *الهكرز المسلمون* (*al-hākirz al-muslimūn*) 'Muslim hackers' in response to the Israeli army's attack on worshipers at al-Aqsa mosque on April 6, 2023, and the burning of the Qur'an by Swedish politicians, Rasmus Paludan, on January 21, 2023. *Al-Hākirz al-Muslimūn* (hereinafter MH) threatened to hack several Israeli and Swedish government infrastructure and services in retaliation. The threat conveyed via the YouTube channel targets total paralysis in various fields of the Israeli and Swedish governments, causing vital problems for their leaders and people.²

In digital activism, MH's threatening actions are part of hacktivism, namely hacking the internet networks as a form of political intervention against certain parties.³ This activism is relatively new and different from traditional digital activism, which focuses on propaganda of issues on the internet and is then followed up with mass mobilization in the field.⁴ In conflicts that raise

¹ AMHed Al-Rawi, "Facebook as a Virtual Mosque: The Online Protest against Innocence of Muslims," *Culture and Religion* 17, no. 1 (2016): 19–34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2016.1159591>; Nikos Smyrnaio and Pierre Ratinaud, "The Charlie Hebdo Attacks on Twitter: A Comparative Analysis of a Political Controversy in English and French," *Social Media and Society* 3, no. 1 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117693647>.

² Hacker News, "Radd Al-Hākirz Al-Muslimīn 'Alā Al-Şahāyanah Ba'd Al-P'tida' 'alā Al-Muṣallīn Dākhl Al-Masjid Al-Aqsā Al-Mubārak," 2023, <https://youtu.be/ALAvksPfb8M>; Hacker News, "Risālah Al-Hākirz Al-Muslimīn Li Al-Swīd Ba'd Harq Al-Qur'ān Al-Karīm," 2023, <https://youtu.be/WmZqWQjfVXw>.

³ Candice Delmas, "Is Hacktivism the New Civil Disobedience?," *Raisons Politiques* 69, no. 1 (2018): 63–81, <https://doi.org/10.3917/rai.069.0063>; Jordana J. George and Dorothy E. Leidner, "From Clicktivism to Hacktivism: Understanding Digital Activism," *Information and Organization* 29, no. 3 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2019.04.001>.

⁴ Delia Dumitrica and Mylynn Felt, "Mediated Grassroots Collective Action: Negotiating Barriers of Digital Activism," *Information Communication and Society* 23, no. 13 (2020): 1821–37, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1618891>.

religious issues in various Arab countries, we can find threats from internet users on digital platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and Facebook.⁵ This phenomenon cannot be separated from the use of social media as voice political aspirations.⁶ The dynamics of the last decade show that this aggressive lingual response consistently accompanies conflicts in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Yemen, and Syria.⁷ However, the writer wants to emphasize that this phenomenon is mostly part of traditional digital activism, not hacktivism, a symbol of modern digital activism.⁸

Several previous linguistic studies have shown that the abuse of sacred symbols of Islam is one of the triggers of threatening language on Arabic social media. In 2015, The Israeli army brigade that banned Muslims from worshipping at the al-Aqsa mosque gave rise to a resistance movement on social media through blasphemous and curse narratives aimed at gaining world attention.⁹ Israel's occupation of the al-Aqsa mosque in 2017 also sparked protests on

⁵ Laila Abbas et al., "TikTok Intifada: Analyzing Social Media Activism Among Youth," *Online Media and Global Communication* 1, no. 2 (2022): 287–314, <https://doi.org/10.1515/omgc-2022-0014>; Adam Smidi and Saif Shahin, "Social Media and Social Mobilisation in the Middle East: A Survey of Research on the Arab Spring," *India Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (2017): 196–209, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928417700798>.

⁶ Yunita Dwi Pramesti, FaMHi Gunawan, and Muhammad Yunus Anis, "Translating Arabic–Indonesian Captions on TikTok Social Media," *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Bahasa Arab* 7, no. 1 May (2023): 181, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jba.v7i1.6619>; Cecile H. Sam, "Shaping Discourse Through Social Media: Using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to Explore the Narratives That Influence Educational Policy," *American Behavioral Scientist* 63, no. 3 (2019): 333–50, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218820565>; Noam Gal, "Ironic Humor on Social Media as Participatory Boundary Work," *New Media and Society* 21, no. 3 (2019): 729–49, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818805719>.

⁷ Magdalena Karolak, "The Use of Social Media from Revolution to Democratic Consolidation: The Arab Spring and the Case of Tunisia," *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 10, no. 2 (2017): 199–216, https://doi.org/10.1386/jammr.10.2.199_1; Walid Magdy, Kareem Darwish, and Ingmar Weber, "#FailedRevolutions: Using Twitter to Study the Antecedents of ISIS Support," *First Monday* 21, no. 2 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v21i2.6372>; Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin, "Rethinking the 'Arab Spring': The Root Causes of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution and Egyptian January 25 Revolution," *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 13, no. 1 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.24035/ijit.06.2018.007>; Hasnil Oktavera, "The Influence of Arab Spring on the Existence of Arabic Language Learning in the Multicultural Society of North Sulawesi," *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Bahasa Arab* 6, no. 2 (2022): 633, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jba.v6i2.4108>.

⁸ Imogen Richards and Mark A. Wood, "Hacktivists against Terrorism: A Cultural Criminological Analysis of Anonymous' Anti- IS Campaigns," *International Journal of Cyber Criminology* 12, no. 1 (2018): 187–205, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1467895>.

⁹ Eric Ping Hung Li and Ajnesh Prasad, "From Wall 1.0 to Wall 2.0: Graffiti, Social Media, and Ideological Acts of Resistance and Recognition Among Palestinian Refugees," *American Behavioral Scientist* 62, no. 4 (2018): 493–511, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759582>.

social media through the spread of hashtags.¹⁰ Likewise, the Israeli army attacked the al-Aqsa mosque, causing many victims in Ramadan 2021. This incident gave rise to a polylog phenomenon filled with expressions of anger and criticism through language that no longer pays attention to aspects of politeness.¹¹ The repressive events that Muslims experienced on a massive scale also spread anti-Israel and anti-Zionist propaganda as a form of resistance.

Not much different, the act of Qur'an burning also sparked a response of criticism from many pro-Islamic internet users. For example, Terry Jones, who burned the Qur'an and campaigned for it on social media through the tagline *Int Burn a Qur'an Day*, reaped many verbal threats, of which 300 were death threats.¹² The publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, in 2005 and the French magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*, in 2015 also provides a clear picture of how pro-Islam groups organize large-scale online protests as a basis for mass mobilization in various countries.¹³ Meanwhile, in the context of the short film *Fitna* and *Innocence of Muslim*, the massive protests were not only in the form of verbal criticism on various sites and online media platforms and demonstrations on the ground but were also conveyed formally by governments in various countries.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ali M A Abushbak and Tawseef Majeed, "The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Crowd Protest-A Case Study of Palestinian Anger Against Israel's Military Measures at Al-Aqsa Compound on Instagram" 40, no. 10 (2020): 511–26; Yuawanda Tri Maryoga and Ibrahim Yahya El Fasha, "Analysis Protection of the Right to Freedom of Religion in Prohibition of Worship at Al Aqsa Mosque by Israeli Police to Palestinians," *Contemporary Issues on Interfaith Law and Society* 1, no. 1 (2022): 59–76, <https://doi.org/10.15294/ciils.v1i1.56713>.

¹¹ Yufni Faisol and Wahyudi RaMHat, "Cyberactivism in Palestinian Conflict News Comments on Al-Jazeera Youtube Channel: A Cyberpragmatic Study (Aktivisme Siber Dalam Komentar Berita Konflik Palestina Di Kanal Youtube Al-Jazeera: Kajian Siberpragmatik)," *Gramatika STKIP PGRI Sumatera Barat* 7, no. 2 (2021): 267–86, <https://doi.org/10.22202/jg.2021.v7i2.4954>.

¹² AMHed Al-Rawi, "The Online Response To the Quran-Burning Incidents," *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity*, no. April 2012 (2016): 105–21, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315637129-7>.

¹³ AMHed Al-Rawi, "Online Reactions to the Muhammad Cartoons: YouTube and the Virtual Ummah," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54, no. 2 (2015): 261–76, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12191>; Lana Kazkaz and Míriam Díez Bosch, "Islamic Caricature Controversy from Jyllands-Posten to Charlie Hebdo from the Perspective of Arab Opinion Leaders," *Religions* 14, no. 7 (2023): 864, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14070864>; Smyrnaios and Ratinaud, "The Charlie Hebdo Attacks on Twitter: A Comparative Analysis of a Political Controversy in English and French."

¹⁴ Al-Rawi, "Facebook as a Virtual Mosque: The Online Protest against Innocence of Muslims"; Ino Augsburg, "Denouncing Divinity: Blasphemy, Human Rights, and the Struggle of Political Leaders to Defend Freedom of Speech in the Case of Innocence of Muslims," no. June (2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/12/low-budget-muhammad-film-prophet>; Zafar Iqbal, Fazal Rahim Khan, and Haseeb Ur ReMHan, "The 'Innocence of Muslims' in the US Media: An Analysis of the Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims," *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 10, no. 1 (2020): 107–35, <https://doi.org/10.32350/jitc.101.06>;

In previous literature, online protest movements that accommodate the existence of these threatening languages are categorized as resistance movements against Zionist and anti-Islam. Zionist, in some of these studies, are defined as specific entities with ambitions to acquire the al-Aqsa mosque and isolate the Palestinian people from the *holy land*.¹⁵ Since 2016, anti-Zionist propaganda defending the area of the al-Aqsa mosque and the *holy land* has become one of the triggers for digital repression against pro-Palestine content on various social media platforms.¹⁶ Meanwhile, anti-Islam is identified as criticism that seeks to degrade Islam and Muslims, both offline and online, in the form of negative attitudes, discrimination, stereotypes, physical threats, and verbal abuse.¹⁷ Anti-Islam is considered by many scholars as the success of media propaganda that positions Islam as the most attacked religion on various digital platforms.¹⁸

In principle, the hacking threat conveyed by MH is also a resistance to Zionists and anti-Islam. They clearly labeled the attack on the al-Aqsa mosque as a Zionists activity. Likewise, the burning of the Qur'an as a form of anti-Islamic activism. However, the MH narrative is completely different from the lingual phenomena portrayed by previous studies. Previous studies analyzed polylogs and single discourses (taglines and hashtags) which were spread sporadically, while MH built a structured and systematic narrative. Polylogs and single discourses examined in previous studies have the characteristics of provocative language because they aim to mobilize the masses and make movements in the field. Meanwhile, MH focuses more on political pressure on discourse targets. They do not aim to provoke and mobilize the masses, because hacking is only done by experts in their group.

Floris Müller, Liesbet Van Zoonen, and Fadi Hirzalla, "Anti-Islam Propaganda and Its Effects: Fitna, Fear-Based Communication and the Moderating Role of Public Debate," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 7, no. 1 (2014): 82–100, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18739865-00701006>.

¹⁵ Ivana Bevilacqua, "E-Scaping Apartheid: Digital Ventures of Zionist Settler Colonialism," *Human Geography(United Kingdom)* 15, no. 2 (2022): 220–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/19427786211055780>.

¹⁶ Mahsa Alimardani and Mona Elswah, "Digital Orientalism: #SaveSheikhJarrah and Arabic Content Moderation," *POMEPS Studies* 43, no. 43 (2021): 69–75, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3900520>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3900520.

¹⁷ Imran Awan, "Islamophobia on Social Media: A Qualitative Analysis of the Facebook's Walls of Hate," *International Journal of Cyber Criminology* 10, no. 1 (2016): 1–20, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.58517>.

¹⁸ Giulia Evolvi, "#Islamexit: Inter-Group Antagonism on Twitter," *Information Communication and Society* 22, no. 3 (2019): 386–401, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1388427>; Karina Horsti, "Digital Islamophobia: The Swedish Woman as a Figure of Pure and Dangerous Whiteness," *New Media and Society* 19, no. 9 (2017): 1440–57, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816642169>.

The difference in the character of the lingual phenomenon and the target of the discourse proves that the threat of MH hacking is a unique object of linguistic research. In addition, the threat of hacking also has a strong and distinctive context. MH targets the destruction of digital infrastructure which will have a large-scale impact on the country's government management. The fear raised by this threat will be greater than facing open demonstrations in the streets. Therefore, the study of MH narratives will provide a new theoretical contribution to linguistic studies amidst the dynamics of language in Arab cyberspace. Apart from that, MH's way of constructing threat narratives can also represent cyber warfare strategies and constellations as a consequence of the *proxy war* waged by many third parties in the conflict landscape in the Middle East.

In this regard, the research on the construction of the MH threat narrative is derived into 3 research questions: (1) How is the formulation of theme of MH's hacking threat narratives against the Zionists and anti-Islamists? (2) How is the sequence of scheme of MH's hacking threat narratives against the Zionists and anti-Islamists? (3) How is the use of micro linguistics elements in MH's hacking threat narratives against the Zionists and anti-Islamists? To answer the research question, a qualitative-explanative study was conducted on the hacking threat narratives published by MH. The research data in the form of videos were taken from the Hacker News YouTube channel (<https://www.youtube.com/@HackerNewsAR/about>) which is a media network for publishing hacking news by various Arab hacker groups. In line with the research objective, the author took 2 videos published by the MH hacker group as objects. Details of the two video data sources are shown in the table 1 below.

Table 1. Research data sources

Code	Title	Link & Date
1	رد الهاكرز المسلمين على الصهاينة بعد الإعتداء على المصلين داخل المسجد الأقصى المبارك <i>Radd al-hākīrīz al-muslimīn 'alā al-sahāyanah ba'd al-I'tidā' 'alā al-muṣallīn dākḥil al-masjid al-aqṣā al-mubārak</i> 'The response of Muslim hackers to the Zionists after the attack on worshipers at the al-Aqsa mosque'	https://youtu.be/ALAvksPfb8M 6 April 2023
2	رسالة الهاكرز المسلمين للسويد بعد حرق القرآن الكريم <i>Risālah al-hākīrīz al-muslimīn li al-swīd ba'd ḥarq al-qur'ān al-karīm</i> 'Muslim hackers' messages to Sweden after the holy Qur'an burning incident'	https://youtu.be/WmZqWQjfVXw 29 Januari 2023

Data collection on video sources is carried out through four stages. *First*, manual transcription with reference to the narrative text displayed in the video. *Second*, reading and observing the data to ensure that no narration is wrong or missing to be transcribed. *Third*, data printing simplifies the selection and classification process. *Fourth*, the selection and classification of data to determine the lingual units to be analyzed based on the features of the theoretical framework used. Meanwhile, data analysis was also carried out by taking four stages. *First*, data reduction to determine the object in the lingual units to be analyzed. *Second*, the presentation of data is based on the analytical features used in the theoretical framework. *Third*, analysis and interpretation of data to describe the lingual elements that construct narratives. *Fourth*, drawing conclusions to confirm answers to research questions.

In accordance with the research questions and objectives, data analysis refers to the discourse structure model proposed by Teun van Dijk. This theory is suitable for describing objects in the form of monologues, so it has distinctions from other theories that are effective in describing dialogue.¹⁹ Dijk stated that the narrative structure of the text as part of the discourse consists of *thematic structure*, *schematic structure*, and *microstructure*.²⁰ The thematic structure is the construction of the theme of a discourse, where the focus of the study is the topic. The schematic structure is the construction of discourse schemes, in which the focus of the study is the structure of the text as a whole. The microstructure is the construction of micro linguistic elements, where the focus of the study is the form, function, meaning, and value contained in the text. Analysis of the three elements of the text can comprehensively describe the structure of a discourse. Therefore, this model is very appropriate to be used to analyze the construction of threat narratives published by MH. The application of the analytical model to answer research questions is shown in the following table 2.

Table 2. The application of the analytical model to answer research questions

Research Questions	Analysis Features
Formulation of Theme	Thematic structure
Sequence of Scheme	Schematic structure
The use of micro linguistics elements	Micro structure

¹⁹ Hanik Mahliatussikah and Mahbub Humaidi Aziz, “Akhbar Khuttah Mishriyyah-Urduniyyah Li Al-Saitharah Alá Taáddud Jihât Al-Qarâr Fi Hamas (Tahlil Al-Khitab Al-Naqdy Teun A. Van Dijk,” *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Babasa Arab* 5, no. 2 (2021): 311, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jba.v5i2.3233>; Muhammad Afif Amrulloh et al., “The Narrative Structure of Ashab Al-Kahf Story,” *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Babasa Arab* 6, no. 2 (2022): 555, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jba.v6i2.4256>.

²⁰ Teun A. Van Dijk, *News As Discourse*, News As Discourse, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203062784>.

Findings and Discussion

To explain the construction of the MH hacking threat narratives, a comprehensive analysis was carried out on the language facts contained in the data. Referring to the analysis model applied, the analysis starts from the theme which is the macro dimension of the narrative to the small details that describe the structure, meaning, and actions in the clause. This comprehensive analysis will outline strategies of MH for assembling words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs to construct a complete narrative. Thus, the construction of the MH hacking threat narrative can be identified and explained comprehensively from a linguistic aspect.

Formulation of Theme of MH's Hacking Threat Narratives against Zionists and Anti-Islamists

As an important element of the narrative, the theme plays a vital role in representing the narrative content of the threat of hacking as a whole. Analysis of the thematic structure model will explain what elements are contained in the MH threat narrative theme that represents the important points of the narrative. In this regard, the themes in data 1 and 2 are shown as follows.

Data 1	رد الهاكرز المسلمين على الصهاينة بعد الاعتداء على المصلين داخل المسجد الأقصى المبارك <i>Radd al-hākiriz al-muslimīn ‘alā al-sabāyanah ba’d al-I’tida’ ‘alā al-muṣallin dākḥil al-masjid al-aqsā al-mubārak</i> ‘The response of Muslim hackers to the Zionists after the attack on worshipers at the al-Aqsa mosque’
Data 2	رسالة الهاكرز المسلمين للسويد بعد حرق القرآن الكريم <i>Risalah al-hākiriz al-muslimīn li al-swīd ba’d ḥarq al-qur’ān al-karīm</i> ‘Muslim hackers’ messages to Sweden after the holy Qur’an burning incident’

The theme in data 1 and 2 above contains a temporal marker in the form of the conjunction *ba’d* 'after' which functions to explain that the threat of hacking is carried out after the triggering action has taken place first. Explicitly, the triggering action is expressed through the nouns الاعتداء (*al-i’tida’*) 'attack' and حرق (*ḥarq*) 'burning' carried out in places of worship and holy books of Muslims, namely المسجد الأقصى (*al-masjid al-aqsā*) 'al-Aqsa mosque' and القرآن (*al-qur’ān*) 'the Qur’an'. To emphasize the al-Aqsa mosque and the Qur’an as sacred symbols in Islam, the two nouns are given the adjectives المبارك (*al-mubārak*) 'blessed' and الكريم (*al-karīm*) 'holy'. Meanwhile, the assertion of identity as Muslim is reflected

through the adjective *مسلمين (muslimin)* 'Muslims' which is attached to the noun phrase *الهاكرز المسلمين (al-hākirz al-muslimin)* 'Muslim hackers' in both data.

Sequence of Scheme of MH's Hacking Threat Narratives against Zionists and Anti-Islamists

The MH hacking threat narrative has a systematic and derivative scheme. As a derivation of the theme, the narration contains several explanatory substances from the theme, including the motivation for revenge, the brutality of opposition to Islam, and the defamation of the sacred symbols of Islam. Meanwhile, the scheme as a whole contains four elements consisting of threat background, threat form, threat detail, and threat effect. Each of these elements is described as follows.

Cause of Threat

The cause of the threat is stated at the beginning of the narrative of the two data. Cause narratives provide context and an overview of the threat. Essentially, through this section, speakers want to explain that they are not threatening sporadically and without cause but are motivated by the motivation of religious struggle to defend Islam. The causes in data 1 and 2 can be seen as follows.

Data 1	<p>قام الجنود الصهيينة بالدوس على حرمة المسجد الأقصى المبارك وأعتدو بقصوة على المصلين داخل المسجد</p> <p><i>Qāma al-junūd al-sahāyanah bi al-daws ‘alā ħurmah al-masjid al-aqsā al-mubārak wa a’tadū bi quswah ‘alā al-muṣallīn dākħil al-masjid</i></p> <p>‘The Zionist army trampled on the sanctity of the al-Aqsa mosque and brutally attacked worshipers inside the mosque’</p>
Data 2	<p>قام المتطرف العنصري "راسموس بالودان" بحرق نسخة من القرآن الكريم في ستوكهولم بالسويد...</p> <p><i>Qāma al-mutaṭarrif al-‘unṣurī “Rasmus Paludan” bi ħarq nuskhah min al-qur’ān al-kaṛīm fī stuħhūlm, bi al-swīd...</i></p> <p>‘Racist extremist "Rasmus Paludan" burned Qur'an in Stockholm, Sweden...’</p>

In data 1 and 2 above, the cause is disclosed in detail from the information mentioned in the theme section, namely the attack on worshipers at the al-Aqsa mosque and the burning of the Qur'an. Details added to data 1 are the specifications of the perpetrators in the form of the noun *الجنود الصهيينة (al-junūd al-sahāyanah)* 'Zionist army' and the attack situation described through the noun *قسوة (quswah)* 'brutal'. Meanwhile, the first detail added to data 2 is the specification of the perpetrators expressed through the associative noun *المتطرف*

راسموس بالودان (*al-mutaṭarrif al-‘unṣuri*) ‘racist extremist’ and the self-name راسموس بالودان (Rāsmus Pālūdān). The second detail in data 2 is the location of the incident expressed through the prepositional phrase في ستوكهولم بالسويد (*fī stūkhūlm bi al-swīd*) ‘in Stockholm, Sweden’. The addition of detail in the cause section has a significant function in providing a wider perspective for the audience to see the reasons for publishing threat narratives.

Form of Threat

The form of threats is the essence of the resistance narrative published by MH. Through threatening speech, they launch psychological warfare (psywar) to attack the psyche of the target. This threat is targeted to impact psychological pressure which can ultimately damage the target's concentration. The form of threats can be seen as follows.

Data 1	<p>وعلى بركة الله نعلن مضاعفة كل العمليات لضرب البنى التحتية للكيان الصهيوني... <i>Wa ‘alā barakah Allah nu’linu muḍā’afah kulli al-‘amaliyyāt li darb al-banā al-ṭaḥṭiyah li al-kiyān al-ṣahyūnī...</i> ‘with the blessing of Allah, we announce the doubling of all operations to attack the Zionist entity...’</p>
Data 2	<p>ستدفعون ثمنها غاليا. وسيكون عليكم تحمل نتائجها. <i>Satadfa’ūna thamanaha ghāliyan. Wa sayakūnu ‘alaykum taḥmilu nata’ijaha</i> ‘You will pay dearly for it. And you will have to bear the consequences.’</p>

The table above reflects the different types of threats in data 1 and 2. Data 1 contains direct threats by explicitly mentioning the form of action, namely مضاعفة كل العمليات (*muḍā’afah kulli al-‘amaliyyāt*) ‘doubling of all operations’. In addition, it is also stated that the target of the cyber operation to be carried out is البنى التحتية للكيان الصهيوني (*al-banā al-ṭaḥṭiyah li al-kiyān al-ṣahyūnī*) ‘Zionist entity’, which in this case is Israeli infrastructure. This form is different from data 2 which tends to mention threats in general, without explaining the form and target of these threats. In data 2 there are only open threats that use hyperbolic forms in the form of the noun phrase ثمنها غاليا (*thamanahā ghāliyan*) ‘a high price’. Implicitly, this metaphor also means that the actions they will take can have a big impact on the Swedish government and its people.

Detail of Threat

Details of threats in the form of targets for cyber-operation attacks are only found in data 1. Meanwhile, data 2 which only contains general threats to the Swedish government and its people, does not contain details of attack targets. The detailed form of these threats can be seen as follows.

Data 1	<p>سنركز على البورصة والبنوك، مواقع الغاز والبترو، والخدمات الرئيسية كالمطارات، والموانئ، والمستشفيات.</p> <p><i>Sanurakkiḡu ‘alā al-bursah wa al-bunūk, mawāqi’ al-ghāḡ wa al-bitrūl, wa al-khidmāt al-raḡsiyah ka al-maṡārāt, wa al-mawāni’, wa al-mustashfayāt.</i></p> <p>‘We will focus on the stock exchange and banks, gas and oil sites, and major services such as airports, ports, and hospitals.’</p>
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The target details for the cyber operation that MH will carry out are a number of Israeli economic and energy strategic infrastructures, namely البورصة و مواقع الغاز والبترو (al-būrṡah wa al-bunūk) 'stock exchange and banks' and مواقع الغاز والبترو (mawāqi’ al-ghāḡ wa al-bitrūl) 'gas and oil sites'. In addition, cyber-attacks will also be directed at Israel's main domestic and foreign service centers in the form of المطارات (al-maṡārāt) 'airports', الموانئ (al-mawāni’) 'ports', and المستشفيات (al-mustashfayāt) 'hospitals'. All goals are vital parts of the governance and survival of Israeli society. Thus, the details of this explicit threat are expected to escalate the psychological impact of anxiety for the Israeli government.

Impact of Threat

The impact that will be caused by cyber operations is mentioned at the end. Schematically, impact points cover a series of threats of attack, thereby constructing a complete narrative. The impact mentioned in data 1 and 2 can be seen as follows.

Data 1	<p>ستألمون كثيرا. سيتم تسريب بيانات شخصية وبطاقة مصرفية. سيتم نشر بيانات عسكرية وتجارية.</p> <p><i>Sataaallamūna kathīran. Sayatimmu tasrību bayānāt shakhsīyyah wa biṡāqah maṡrafiyah. Sayatimmu nasbr bayānāt ‘askariyyah wa tijāriyyah.</i></p> <p>‘You will suffer a lot. Personal and bank card data will be leaked. Military and commercial data will be exposed.’</p>
Data 2	<p>ما قام به بالودان ستدفع ثمنه حكومة السويد. وسيعاني شعب السويد بسبب ذلك.</p> <p><i>Mā qāma bibi Palūdān satadfa’ thamanabu hukūmah al-swīd. Wa sayu’ānī sha’b al-swīd bisabab dbālik.</i></p> <p>‘What Paludan did will be paid for by the Swedish government. And the people of Sweden will suffer because of it.’</p>

The table above shows that there are similarities in the construction pattern of the impact narrative with the form of threat in data 1 and 2. The

impact is mentioned in detail in data 1, but only generally in data 2. In data 1, the impact of the attack is *تسريب بيانات شخصية و بطاقة مصرفية* (*tasrīb bayānāt shakhsīyyah wa biṭāqah maṣrafīyah*) 'personal and bank card data leak' and *نشر بيانات عسكرية و تجارية* (*nashr bayānāt 'askariyyah wa tijāriyyah*) 'military and commercial data exposure'. While in data 2, the impact of the attack is described as a general situation *سيعاني شعب السويد بسبب ذلك* (*sayu'ānī sha'b al-swīd bisabab dhālik*) 'the people of Sweden will suffer because of it'. In the structure of the threat narrative, the forms of impact mentioned in the two data functions to increase fear and political pressure on the target.

Use of Micro Linguistics Elements of MH's Hacking Threat Narratives against Zionists and Anti-Islamists

Micro linguistics elements consist of the form, function, and meaning of a lingual phenomenon. In the MH threat narrative, micro linguistic elements are identified through clause structure, meaning intention, and speech acts. Each of these elements is described in detail as follows.

Clause Structures

In general, the structure of the clause that is widely used in data is verbal clause (*جملة فعلية / jumlah fi'liyah*) whose basic form consists of a verb (*فعل / fi'il*) and a noun (*اسم / ism*). Apart from the general structure, there are several modified structures in several places. The modified structure is composed by replacing the initial predicate in the form of a base verb with the neutral verb form *قام* (*qāma*) 'to do'. After that, the basic verb is shifted to the end of the clause and undergoes a nominalization process that begins with the preposition *ب* (*bi*) 'with'. This modification also replaces the function of the basic verb which was previously a predicate to an adverb. An example of changing the basic structure into a modified structure can be seen in following analysis.

	Basic structure	الجنود الصهيونية	داس
		<i>al-junnūd al-ṣabāyanah</i>	<i>dāsa</i>
		'Zionist army'	'trampled'
Modified Structure	بالدوس	الجنود الصهيونية	قام
	<i>bi al-daws</i>	<i>al-junnūd al-ṣabāyanah</i>	<i>qāma</i>
	'trampling'	'Zionist army'	'did'

Referring to the structure of the Arabic clause, the clause in data 1 above has the basic structure of *داس الجنود الصهيونية* (*dāsa al-junnūd al-ṣabāyanah*) 'Zionist army trampled'. This basic structure is only filled with verbs and nouns. However, in the MH threat narrative, this basic structure is replaced with a

modified structure. In the modified structure, the base verb is replaced with the neuter *qāma* verb, while the previous basic verb (*dāsa*) is nominalized to *دوس* (*daws*) through a preposition and is positioned at the end of the clause. The modified structure forms a longer clause, namely *قام الجنود الصهيوني بالدوس* (*qāma al-junūd al-sabāyanah bi al-daws*) 'Zionist army trampled'.

Meaning Intentions

Semantically, modification of clause structure has an impact on the focus of meaning. Replacing the basic verb with the neutral verb *قام* (*qāma*) 'to do' has an impact on the occurrence of indirect fronting which promotes the subject *الجنود الصهاينة* (*al-junūd al-sabāyanah*) 'Zionist army' and *المتطرف العنصري* (*al-mutaṭarrif al-'uṣuri*) 'racist extremist' to the beginning of the clause. Thus, this modification changes the focus of the discussion which was previously the activities of *داس* (*dāsa*) 'trampled' and *حرق* (*haraqā*) 'burned' to become agents of *الجنود الصهاينة* (*al-junūd al-sabāyanah*) 'Zionist army' and *المتطرف العنصري* (*al-mutaṭarrif al-'uṣuri*) 'racist extremists'. In accordance with the essence of the analysis of the macrostructural and superstructural aspects, it is these two objects that the speaker wants to be the focus of the audience's attention. The shift in the focus of the conversation can be seen in the following analysis.

Structure	Data 1	Data 2
Basic structure	<i>dāsa</i> 'trampled'	<i>haraqā</i> 'burned'
Modified structure	<i>الجنود الصهاينة</i> <i>al-junūd al-sabāyanah</i> 'Zionist army'	<i>المتطرف العنصري</i> <i>al-mutaṭarrif al-'uṣurī</i> 'racist extremist'

Speech Acts

Pragmatically, the data is dominated by commissive speech acts that function as 'threatening'. The commissive speech which implies a commitment to do something in the future is characterized by the use of *الأحرف المضارعة* (*al-aḥruf al-muḍāra'ah*) 'future tense marker letters'. This phenomenon can be seen in the following analysis.

Data 1	Data 2
<i>سيتقابله دماء كثيرة</i> <i>ṣatuqābiluhu dimā' kathīrah</i> 'you will replace it with a lot of blood'	<i>سيتدفعون ثمنها غاليا</i> <i>ṣatadfa'ūna thamanahā ghālīyan</i> 'you will pay dearly for it'
<i>سيتألمون كثيرا</i>	<i>سيعاني شعب السويد</i>

<i>satataallamūna kathīran</i> 'you will suffer a lot'	<i>sayu'ānī sha'b al-swīd</i> 'the people of Sweden will suffer'
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Data 1 and 2 in the table above contain commissive speech acts which are marked by the use of the letters mudara'ah in the form of السين (*al-sīn*) 'will' which is connected to the verb. In terms of meaning characteristics, the use of the letter al-sin means the future which has a short distance. This is different from the use of سوف (*sanfa*) 'will' which semantically means having a considerable distance in time. Thus, through the use of the letter al-sīn, the speaker's commitment that the Zionist soldiers will replace (*satuqābilubn*) their actions with lots of blood and they will suffer (*satataallamūna*) will occur in the near future. Likewise, the speaker's commitment that the Swedish government pays a heavy price (*satadfa'ūna*) for their actions and the Swedish people suffer (*sayu'ānī*), will also occur in the near future.

Based on the findings above, the construction of MH's narrative against the Zionists and anti-Islamists has a distinction from the narratives of previous studies, both in rhetoric and in the use of clauses.²¹ Several studies of counter-Zionism narratives show a tendency to label actors as Zionist rather than Israel as a form of delegitimization of their occupation of Palestine.²² However, the Zionist labeling is also motivated by subjective political interests such as maintaining state ideology, highlighting a leadership role at the global level, and strengthening citizen communal identities.²³ This motivation is not found in the anti-Zionist narrative spread by MH. This is partly due to the absence of a background of subjective political interests in their actions other than defending Islam. Their motivation to defend Islam also refutes studies that state that the demonization of the Zionists is only caused by fanaticism and hatred instead of ideological roots.²⁴

MH's narrative also resolutely reverses the perspective of several previous researchers who tend to position negative sentiments and actions

²¹ Abdul Basid et al., "Intransitive Independent Clauses in Film 'Dīb': Modern Linguistic Study Based on Kenneth L. Pike's Tagmemic Perspective," *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Bahasa Arab* 6, no. 2 (2022): 349, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jba.v6i2.4240>; Bambang Bambang and Hazuar Hazuar, "Mafhum Al-Nahy Bayna Al-Balaghiyyin Wa Al-Ushuliyyin," *Arabiyatuna: Jurnal Bahasa Arab* 1, no. 2 (2017): 179–98. <http://dx.doi.org/10.29240/jba.v1i2.321>.

²² Rusi Jaspal, "Israel in the Iranian Media: Demonizing the 'Zionist Regime,'" *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 7, no. 1 (2013): 77–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2013.11446536>.

²³ Rusi Jaspal, "The Social Psychology of Contemporary Antisemitism," *Israel Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2023): 31–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2023.2166203>.

²⁴ Ernest Sternberg, "The Origin of Globalized Anti-Zionism: A Conjunction of Hatreds since the Cold War," *Israel Affairs* 21, no. 4 (2015): 585–601, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2014.984419>.

against Islam as *Islamophobia*.²⁵ For MH, these negative sentiments and actions are acts of hatred that reflect an act of anti-Islam and against Islam, not *Islamophobia*, which tends to mean prejudice and fear of Islam. Through its narratives that emphasize the negative actions of anti-Islamic groups as fueling anger, MH also reverses media propaganda that labels Muslim groups as extremists. MH openly said that anti-Islamists are also part of extremists because they are radical and often provoke Muslims' anger. MH's narrative is in line with research findings stating that extremism exists in all religions, but media propaganda tends to corner Islam compared to other religions.²⁶

From the aspect of lingual form, MH's threat to the Zionists and anti-Islamists reinforces previous studies which also analyze the protests of pro-Islamic groups against the attack on the al-Aqsa mosque and the Qur'an burning in various online media. In these studies, threats are indeed one of the dominant expressions.²⁷ However, from the aspect of narrative construction, the threat of hacking MH is significantly different from the lingual facts in these studies. The data in previous studies are polylog in nature, so the analysis is limited to the mapping of expressions, sentiments, meanings, and values. This phenomenon is different from the MH threat which is in the form of a complete narrative. MH's narrative shows a new pattern in the spread of threats against Zionists and anti-Islamists, in which lingual facts are woven in a structured and systematic manner, to be able to provide a clearer and more directed perspective.

Overall, the hacking threats published by MH represent a new form of digital activism that transcends traditional forms of digital activism.²⁸ In their

²⁵ Awan, "Islamophobia on Social Media: A Qualitative Analysis of the Facebook's Walls of Hate"; Christine Ogan et al., "The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and Islamophobia in Europe and the United States," *International Communication Gazette* 76, no. 1 (2014): 27–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048513504048>.

²⁶ Horsti, "Digital Islamophobia: The Swedish Woman as a Figure of Pure and Dangerous Whiteness"; Kimberly A. Powell, "Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016," *Religions* 9, no. 9 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9090257>.

²⁷ Abushbak and Majeed, "The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Crowd Protest-A Case Study of Palestinian Anger Against Israel's Military Measures at Al-Aqsa Compound on Instagram"; Al-Rawi, "The Online Response To the Quran-Burning Incidents"; Al-Rawi, "Online Reactions to the Muhammad Cartoons: YouTube and the Virtual Ummah"; Al-Rawi, "Facebook as a Virtual Mosque: The Online Protest against Innocence of Muslims"; Faisal and RaMHat, "Cyberactivism in Palestinian Conflict News Comments on Al-Jazeera Youtube Channel: A Cyberpragmatic Study (Aktivisme Siber Dalam Komentar Berita Konflik Palestina Di Kanal Youtube Al-Jazeera: Kajian Siberpragmatik)"; Yufni Faisal and Wahyudi RaMHat, "Negative Impoliteness and Reconstruction of Identity: Cyberpragmatics Analysis of Palestinian Conflict News Comments on Arab Youtube Channel," *Jurnal Arbitrer* 8, no. 2 (2021): 168, <https://doi.org/10.25077/ar.8.2.168-179.2021>.

²⁸ George and Leidner, "From Clicktivism to Hacktivism: Understanding Digital Activism"; Argyro P. Karanasiou, "The Changing Face of Protests in the Digital Age: On Occupying Cyberspace and Distributed-Denial-of-Services (DDoS) Attacks," *International Review*

threat narratives, MH managed to use language effectively to provide a large-scale psychological effect in the form of fear of the threat target. The dynamics and development of technology in the future are very likely that the type of hacking threat carried out by MH will become a trend of digital activism. For the nations of the world, the threat of hacking can be more worrisome than the threat of mass mobilization on the streets.²⁹ This is because most government management activities rely heavily on digital technology. Therefore, it is very natural that the threat of hacking as a form of protest will be able to provide higher political pressure than large-scale demonstrations.

Conclusion

Based on the findings obtained through the thematic, schematic, and microanalysis above, it is found that MH constructs narratives of hacking threats in a structured, systematic, and effective manner. In the context of motives, MH emphasizes his threats as a response to acts of insulting Islamic sacred symbols. Their self-association as Muslims is done to build the authority and legitimacy of the movement so that they can gain sympathy from a large audience. One of the characteristics of the threat narratives they propagate is psychological warfare that targets large-scale impact. MH mentioned in detail the target of the hack in the form of strategic and vital digital infrastructure. This narrative causes the leak of personal data, banking, and military and commercial data exposure. The projected threat to occur shortly reflects efforts to exert pressure and political pressure on the targets, which in this case are the governments of Israel and Sweden.

Even though it has explained the construction of the MH hacking narrative against Israel and Sweden, which they call Zionist and anti-Islamist, this research still has limitations. One of the limitations is the small amount of the data. This research only uses two videos published by MH as sources of data. In the future, similar narratives can become research areas for other researchers. Hacking narratives are not only in videos but also in written text sent via e-mail or social media accounts. Apart from that, MH's hacking threats video can also be used as a material object for other studies. For example, critical discourse analysis has the opportunity to examine the ideology behind the narrative and map the power relations played by discourse producers.

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²⁹ Christian Beck, "Web of Resistance: Deleuzian Digital Space and Hacktivism," *Journal for Cultural Research* 20, no. 4 (2016): 334–49, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2016.1168971>.

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